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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 











SUPERINTENDENT COAL TOWNSHIP SCI; DISTRICT ATTORNEY 
PHILADELPHIA; ATTORNEY GENERAL PENNSYLVANIA 
    
______________ 
 
Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. No. 2-18-cv-00046) 
District Judge:  Honorable J. Curtis Joyner 
______________ 
 
Submitted under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
March 15, 2021 
______________ 
 
Before: SHWARTZ, PORTER, and MATEY, Circuit Judges. 
  






  This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, 







SHWARTZ, Circuit Judge. 
  
Armel Baxter was convicted of first-degree murder, criminal conspiracy, and 
possession of an instrument of crime in Pennsylvania state court.  Baxter filed a federal 
habeas petition, asserting that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the 
trial court’s reasonable doubt jury instruction.1  The District Court denied Baxter’s 
petition, but issued a certificate of appealability.  Because the reasonable doubt 
instruction did not prejudice Baxter, we will affirm. 
I 
A 
 On a warm April 2007 afternoon, Demond Brown was shot and killed at a 
playground in Philadelphia.  Two eyewitness accounts and a corroborating witness 
implicated Baxter and his co-defendant Jeffrey McBride as the shooters.  The two 
eyewitnesses, Hassan Durant and Anthony Harris, saw Baxter and McBride enter the 
playground wearing hooded sweatshirts.  Brown noticed the pair and began to run.  The 
pair then shot Brown eight to ten times and ran away.  Durant and Harris knew Baxter 
from living in the same neighborhood.  
Rachel Marcelis, a friend of Baxter and McBride, confirmed Baxter and 
McBride’s presence at the playground and their roles in the shooting.  On the day of the 
 
1 Baxter raised other issues, but we focus on the sole claim for which a certificate 




incident, Marcelis drove by the playground with McBride and Baxter in her car.  Either 
McBride or Baxter said they saw someone at the playground and told her to stop to let 
them out of the car, and she did so.  She thereafter noticed many people running from the 
playground, including Baxter and McBride.  Baxter and McBride got back into the car 
and said that “they got him” and that McBride “didn’t have the chance to shoot” because 
his gun did not work.  J.A. 158, 160.  McBride later told Marcelis that Brown had killed 
their good friend.  That weekend, Marcelis drove Baxter and McBride to Wilkes-Barre, 
Pennsylvania.  Marcelis returned to Philadelphia a few days later, but McBride and 
Baxter stayed in Wilkes-Barre until their arrests.2  When law enforcement first 
confronted Baxter in Wilkes-Barre, Baxter gave three false names.   
B 
 Baxter was charged with first-degree murder, 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 2502(a); 
criminal conspiracy to engage in murder, id. § 903(a)(1); and first-degree possession of 
an instrument of a crime with intent to employ it criminally, id. § 907(a).  Durant, Harris, 
and Marcelis testified at his trial.   
 At issue in this appeal is the trial judge’s reasonable doubt instruction.  The trial 
judge first explained that the Commonwealth’s burden of proof is “beyond a reasonable 
doubt,” which is “the highest standard in the law,” and is “the only standard that supports 
a verdict of guilty.”  J.A. 34.  The trial judge stated that the Commonwealth “is not 
 
2 At trial, Baxter’s lawyer attempted to impeach Marcelis by suggesting that she 
imagined the events as the result of drugs and alcohol she consumed the night before the 
shooting.  Marcelis admitted to using drugs and not sleeping that night but testified that 




required to meet some mathematical certainty” or “to demonstrate the complete 
impossibility of innocence.”  J.A. 34.  Instead, the trial judge explained that reasonable 
doubt is “a doubt that would cause a reasonably careful and sensible person to pause, to 
hesitate, to refrain from acting upon a matter of the highest importance to your own 
affairs or to your own interests.”  J.A. 34. 
 The judge then provided an example for how to think about reasonable doubt:  
If you were advised by your loved one’s physician that that loved one had a 
life-threatening illness and that the only protocol was a surgery, very likely 
you would ask for a second opinion.  You’d probably get a third opinion.  
You’d probably start researching the illness, what is the protocol, is surgery 
really the only answer.  You’d probably, if you’re like me, call everybody 
you know in medicine:  What do you know about this illness?  What do you 
know about this surgery?  Who does this surgery across the country?  What 
is my option.   
 
At some moment, however, you’re going to be called upon to make a 
decision:  Do you allow your loved one to go forward?  If you go forward, 
it’s because you have moved beyond all reasonable doubt. 
 
J.A. 34.  The judge then explained that “a reasonable doubt must be a real doubt” and 
“may not be a doubt that is imagined or manufactured to avoid carrying out an unpleasant 
responsibility.”  J.A. 34.  Defense counsel did not object to the instruction.   
A jury convicted Baxter on all charges, and Baxter was sentenced to life in prison 
without parole for first-degree murder, and concurrent terms of ten-to-twenty years’ 
imprisonment for conspiracy and one-to-two years’ imprisonment for instrument 
possession.   
 The Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed Baxter’s conviction, Commonwealth v. 




review, Commonwealth v. Baxter, 17 A.3d 1250 (Pa. 2011).  Baxter filed a pro se 
petition and amended petition under the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa. 
Cons. Stat. § 9541 et seq., raising several arguments challenging the effectiveness of his 
trial counsel, but not challenging counsel’s failure to object to the reasonable doubt jury 
instruction.  The PCRA court denied Baxter’s petition, the Pennsylvania Superior Court 
affirmed, Commonwealth v. Baxter, 159 A.3d 589 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2016), and the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied review, Commonwealth v. Baxter, 169 A.3d 547 
(Pa. 2017). 
 Baxter petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for 
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, arguing for the first time that his trial counsel was 
ineffective for failing to object to the trial court’s reasonable doubt instruction.3  The 
Magistrate Judge concluded that his claim was meritless because “[a]lthough the 
contested instruction is inartful and its illustration inapt,” jury instructions should be 
viewed in their entirety, and here, the instruction read as a whole was constitutional.  
Baxter v. McGinley, No. 18-cv-46, 2019 WL 7606222, at *5-6 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 5, 2019) 
(citing Supp. Report & Recomm., Corbin v. Tice, No. 16-4527 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 15, 2019), 
ECF No. 42).  Accordingly, the Magistrate Judge recommended that the petition for writ 
of habeas corpus be denied with prejudice.  Id. at *10.  
 
3 Despite Baxter’s failure to raise this ineffective assistance of counsel claim until 
his petition for a writ of habeas corpus, the Commonwealth does not argue that Baxter’s 




 The District Court adopted the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation, 
but found that there was probable cause to issue a certificate of appealability on Baxter’s 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on his trial counsel’s failure to object to the 
trial court’s reasonable doubt instruction.  Baxter appeals.   
II4 
A 
Because Baxter’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim regarding the 
constitutionality of the reasonable doubt instruction was not adjudicated on the merits in 
state court, we need not apply the deferential standard of review set forth in the 
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).  Rather, our review 
of the state court’s legal determinations is plenary.  Appel v. Horn, 250 F.3d 203, 210 (3d 
Cir. 2001).  Because the District Court did not hold an evidentiary hearing, our review of 
its decision is plenary.  Ross v. Dist. Att’y of the Cnty. of Allegheny, 672 F.3d 198, 205 
(3d Cir. 2012).    
B 
 Baxter argues that his counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the 
reasonable doubt instruction.  Normally, we would review an ineffective assistance claim 
under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984), which requires that we 
consider whether the failure to object fell below the standards for competent 
representation and whether that failure resulted in prejudice. 
 
4 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.  This Court has 




 We will assume that the failure to object to the instruction fell below the standard 
for competent representation,5 and thus focus on the prejudice issue.  Under Strickland, to 
establish prejudice, a petitioner must show that “there is a reasonable probability that, but 
for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been 
different.”  466 U.S. at 694.  Baxter, however, contends that he need not prove actual 
prejudice because the failure to object to the reasonable doubt jury instruction led to a 
structural error, and such errors so fundamentally impact the trial process that prejudice is 
presumed.  We will therefore discuss the concept of structural error and whether 
prejudice is always presumed. 
 The Supreme Court has defined a structural error as one that “affect[s] the 
framework within which the trial proceeds, rather than being simply an error in the trial 
process itself.”  Weaver v. Massachusetts, 137 S. Ct. 1899, 1907 (2017) (alteration in 
original) (quotation marks and citation omitted).  The Court has identified the following 
as structural errors:  (1) complete deprivation of the right to counsel; (2) lack of an 
impartial judge; (3) unlawful exclusion of grand jurors of the defendant’s race; (4) denial 
of the right to self-representation at trial; (5) denial of the right to a public trial; and (6) an 
 
5 Although the Commonwealth does not challenge whether the failure to object to 
the instruction fell below the standard of competent representation, there are persuasive 
arguments that the instruction, read in its entirety, did not violate due process and thus 
justified counsel’s decision not to object to the instruction.  See Supp. Report & 
Recomm. Corbin, No. 16-4527, ECF No. 42 (collecting cases and upholding identical 
jury instructions because “in evaluating a challenge to jury instructions, the court must 
‘consider the totality of the instructions and not a particular sentence or paragraph in 
isolation’” (quoting United States v. Thayer, 201 F.3d 214, 221 (3d Cir. 1999))).  We, 




erroneous reasonable doubt jury instruction.  See Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 
468-69 (1997) (collecting cases); Lewis v. Pinchak, 348 F.3d 355, 358 (3d Cir. 2003).     
 The Supreme Court has stated that  “the . . . doctrines [of structural error and 
ineffective assistance of counsel] are intertwined; for the reasons an error is deemed 
structural may influence the proper standard used to evaluate an ineffective-assistance 
claim premised on the failure to object to that error.”  Weaver, 137 S. Ct. at 1907.  A 
showing of structural error, however, does not always trigger a presumption of prejudice.  
For example, in Weaver, the Supreme Court examined a structural error related to the 
right to a public trial, closing the courtroom during jury selection, and whether that error 
triggered a presumption of prejudice.  137 S. Ct. at 1905.  The petitioner argued that he 
need not show prejudice, as his attorney’s failure to object to the courtroom closure (the 
structural error) rendered the trial “fundamentally unfair.”  Id. at 1911.  
The Court stated that it would “assume,” “[f]or the analytical purposes of th[e] case,” 
“that petitioner’s interpretation of Strickland is the correct one,”  but, in light of its 
ultimate holding, it wrote that it “need not decide that question here.”  Id.  The Court 
concluded that, even under the petitioner’s theory, while some deprivations of the right to 
a public trial might not require proof of actual prejudice, others do require such proof.  
See id. at 1908 (“[T]he question is whether a public-trial violation counts as structural 
because it always leads to fundamental unfairness or for some other reason.”).  The Court 




being adduced, and thus prejudice was not presumed.6  See id. at 1913 (explaining that 
some circumstances might warrant a presumption of prejudice, such as if “defense 
counsel errs in failing to object when the government’s main witness testifies in secret”). 
 Assuming without deciding that an inartful or partially incorrect reasonable doubt 
instruction constitutes a structural error, and, like the Weaver Court, “that prejudice can 
be shown by a demonstration of fundamental unfairness,” we will apply a similar 
approach to evaluate whether such an error triggers the presumption of prejudice.  Id. at 
1913.  The complete failure to give such an instruction is a structural error that so infects 
the trial process that the verdict cannot be said to reflect a proper verdict in a criminal 
case.  See Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 281 (1993) (stating that “[d]enial of the 
right to a jury verdict of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt” is a “structural defect[] in the 
constitution of the trial mechanism, which def[ies] analysis by harmless-error standards” 
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).  In such circumstances, “the resulting 
trial is always a fundamentally unfair one.”  Weaver, 137 S. Ct. at 1908 (citing Sullivan, 
508 U.S. at 279).  When a reasonable doubt instruction is given, however, the rules 
 
6 Contrary to Baxter’s argument, Weaver did not establish that an erroneous 
reasonable doubt instruction is a structural error that warrants presumptive prejudice.  In 
Weaver, the Supreme Court acknowledged that its holding did not call into question 
precedents determining that certain structural errors, such as an erroneous jury 
instruction, require automatic reversal if raised on direct appeal.  137 S. Ct. at 1911-12 
(citing, e.g., Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 278-79 (1993)).  Furthermore, the Court 
declined to address, in the context of structural errors other than the one at issue in 
Weaver, “whether the result should be any different if the errors were raised instead in an 
ineffective-assistance claim on collateral review,” as is the case here.  Id. at 1912; see 
also id. at 1907 (limiting the holding to “the context of trial counsel’s failure to object to 




concerning evaluating a jury instruction apply.  United States v. Isaac, 134 F.3d 199, 204 
(3d Cir. 1998).  These rules “do[] not require that any particular form of words be used in 
advising the jury of the government’s burden of proof.”  Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 
5 (1994).  Instead, the rules require examining the language in its totality and determining 
whether the instructions correctly captured the applicable legal concepts.  Isaac, 134 F.3d 
at 204 (upholding a reasonable doubt instruction because although part of the instruction 
was erroneous, “this defect was counterbalanced by the explanation that preceded and 
succeeded it”).  In the context of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, if we 
conclude that the instruction contains an error, we then examine whether the instruction 
resulted in actual prejudice.7   
 Here, Baxter contends, and the Commonwealth does not dispute, that the 
instruction contained an example that impacted the accuracy of the jury instruction.  Even 
if the example used in the instruction improperly cast the reasonable doubt standard, the 
surrounding language correctly expressed the standard.  Moreover, the evidence against 
 
7 This approach is similar to how we examine various claims of ineffective 
assistance of counsel.  For example, in United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 658 (1984), 
the Supreme Court noted that prejudice is presumed when (1) there is complete denial of 
counsel, (2) counsel fails to subject the prosecution’s case to meaningful adversarial 
testing, or (3) there is a very small likelihood that even a fully competent counsel could 
provide effective assistance.  Id. at 659-60; see also Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 695-96 
(2002) (same).  When, however, counsel makes an isolated error during the trial, such as 
failing to object to a jury instruction, the defendant must show actual prejudice to prevail 
on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.  See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695-96 
(distinguishing errors that have an “isolated, trivial” effect and do not affect factual 
findings from those that have a pervasive effect that therefore result in a “breakdown in 
the adversarial process”).  Thus, not all errors involving the actions of counsel trigger a 




Baxter shows that even the inapt example did not prejudice him.  See Buehl v. Vaughn, 
166 F.3d 163, 171-72 (3d Cir. 1999) (concluding that “[i]n view of the magnitude of the 
evidence that the Commonwealth presented,” the defendant could not show he was 
prejudiced by the absence of a limiting instruction).  Various eyewitnesses who were in 
close proximity of and who knew Baxter for years testified that Baxter and McBride 
chased Brown and repeatedly shot him.  Baxter’s friend Marcelis corroborated the 
eyewitness accounts with her report of driving Baxter and McBride to the playground, 
hearing their incriminating remarks after the shooting and their motive for it, and their 
flight to Wilkes-Barre.8  This flight, together with Baxter’s use of false names when he 
encountered law enforcement after the murder, provided a basis to infer a consciousness 
of guilt.  In light of this evidence, Baxter cannot show he was prejudiced by the phrasing 
of the example in an otherwise correct reasonable doubt jury instruction.  See Saranchak 
v. Secretary, Pa. Dep’t of Corrs., 802 F.3d 579, 592 (3d Cir. 2015) (concluding that trial 
errors “did not contribute to a reasonable probability of a different outcome given the 
strength of the Commonwealth’s case”).  Accordingly, Baxter’s counsel’s failure to 
 
8 Baxter’s challenges to the strength of the evidence are not persuasive.  First, 
although Baxter notes that Durant had an open drug case at the time he testified, there 
was no promise he would reason favorable treatment in that case in exchange for his 
testimony against Baxter.  Next, Baxter relies upon testimony at the PCRA hearing to 
argue that Harris identified a different shooter.  Because this evidence was not presented 
at trial, we cannot consider it to determine prejudice.  See Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 
U.S. 370, 389 (2010) (“In assessing prejudice, courts must consider the totality of the 
evidence before the judge or jury.” (quotation marks and citations omitted)).  His efforts 
to undermine Marcelis testimony also fail.  The jury had sufficient evidence to reject his 
argument that Marcelis imagined the events about which she testified given her testimony 




object to the reasonable doubt instruction did not prejudice him, and thus he cannot show 
he was deprived of effective assistance of counsel. 
III 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm. 
